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see themselves as grounded in voluntary decision and not in the proofs of reason,
tolerance of others who make commitments different from one's own is morally
required.
This conclusion has implications for distinguishing between moral and religious
practices. Since morality is universally binding on all, prescriptions that are
binding only on a particular body of believers cannot legitimately be considered
moral injunctions. De George gives the dietary laws of the Hebrew Scriptures
as examples of religious rules as distinct from moral ones. He is more interested
in establishing general principles than in ruling on particular disputes. However,
a discussion of the application of these principles to the contemporary controversy
over the morality of abortion would have been especially illuminating, since on
this issue there are vast disagreements among the contending parties. How far
ought we go in ruling that an issue is not a moral issue but a religious one, in
the face of substantial disagreement? De George does not fully discuss this
controversial issue, but the fact that he leads us to raise it in this new way is a
strength and not a weakness of his study.

Evolution and Creation, ed. Ernan McMullin. Notre Dame, IN: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1985. Pp. xv and 307. $24.96.
HOWARD J. VAN TILL, Calvin College.
We have come to have high expectations of Eman McMullin, and in this volume
we are not disappointed. McMullin introduces this collection of essays (most of
them presented at the Conference on Creation and Evolution at the University
of Notre Dame, March, 1983) with an historical overview of the concepts of
creation and evolution. After discussing several early Greek cosmogonies,
McMullin notes that while there was no theory of evolutionary mechanisms in
early Greek thought, the basic idea of evolution was widely accepted.
Although the creation narratives found in Genesis played important roles in
Hebrew covenantal history, it was Christianity, according to McMullin, that
developed the creation concept into a creation doctrine by its engagement with
Greek metaphysical thought. This point is amply demonstrated and related to
the idea of evolution by an extended review of the contributions of Augustine
(whose concept of "seed-principles" was open to the idea of evolution) and
Aquinas (whose accommodation principle of biblical interpretation left room for
incorporating the science of the day into a Christian worldview).
The modem concept of evolution is traced back to Descartes' "genetic" concept
of the world's formative history. According to McMullin, Descartes was appa-
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rently convinced by the coherence of the relevant physical and theological
argumentation that "cosmic history is not just possible: it is a conceptual necessity"
(p. 26). But the concept of cosmic evolution did not rest comfortably with the
"physico-theology" (or natural theology) of the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries.
McMullin outlines the tension between design and development, instantaneous
intervention and gradual process, catastrophism and uniformitarianism. The
legacy of such tensions, coupled with the tendency to identify divine action with
gaps in "natural" explanations, is "to make evolution and creation seem like
exclusive concepts" (p. 35). "The opposition which is so often perceived between
them today derives in some part from the persistent attempt over two centuries
to build a belief in the Creator on the supposed impossibility of an evolutionary
accounts of origins. Augustine knew better!" (p. 38).
Problems and questions remain, however, to be adequately engaged. Hence
the remainder of the essays in this volume.
In his essay on "Recent Successes and Challenges" in evolutionary theorizing,
geneticist Francisco Ayala employs a number of helpful distinctions. The propositions which collectively comprise contemporary theories of evolution, says
Ayala, can be subdivided into three sets: (1) the proposition that organisms are
related by common descent; (2) propositions pertaining to particular evolutionary
histories; and (3) propositions concerning the specific mechanisms by which
evolutionary change may occur.
Speaking on behalf of the relevant professional scientific community, Ayala
says that proposition (1) has been established to a high degree of certainty-hence
the common reference to the "fact" of evolution. The propositions comprising
categories (2) and (3) are matters of current investigation; within these categories
some theories appear firmly established while others are recognized as highly
conjectural. Specific examples are provided by Ayala.
Because I have recently invested considerable time in evaluating numerous
claims and theories found in the "scientific creationist" literature, I found reading
Ayala's essay most refreshing for its employment of careful distinctions among
the various categories of questions pertaining to biological evolution and for its
candor in speaking not only of the successes in evolutionary theorizing, but also
of the unsolved puzzles that challenge contemporary investigators. Such honesty
is expected in professional scientific scholarship; its absence in some arenas of
Christian theorizing is regrettable.
In "Modem Cosmology and the Creation of Life" John Leslie explores the
merits of a modern version of the design argument. According to contemporary
cosmological models, a cosmos having a formative history that leads to life does
indeed appear to require a high degree of "fine tuning" in the values of numerous
physical parameters. How can this be explained? Is it nothing more than an
unavoidable selection effect-that from a large or infinite number of universes
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we, as living and rational beings, could naturally exist only in one such as this
finely tuned one? Or, on the other hand, is this one finely tuned universe the
product of specific design by God?
Leslie rejects the many-universe approach in favor of what he labels "the God
hypothesis." He lists and evaluates what various critics view as weaknesses of
the design argument and concludes that not only do these objections fail, but
they also threaten to impede the very development of science. The anthropic
principle, which requires the many universe hypothesis to make the present state
of affairs unsurprising, is viewed by Leslie as singularly jejune.
Now, while I join Professor Leslie in recognizing that the existence of a
life-containing universe demands some sort of explanation, and while I see some
merit in a modernized version of the design argument, I find his particular version
of it unsatisfying. When Leslie speaks of the "God hypothesis" he is speaking
of God not as an "inexplicably existing person," but rather as an impersonal
"creative ethical requirement." But what, I would ask, makes the existence of
a nebulous "creative ethical requirement" any less inexplicable than a personal
God? According to Leslie, his belief is grounded in the "hope that some of my
actions do have behind them an authority beyond that of mere desires" (p. 117).
To say that such a hope provides a weak base for a very important belief is
surely an understatement. But even a modernized design argument that appeals
to a personal God as the source of the world's finely tuned design leaves me a
bit uneasy. Is the "God of fine tuning" any substantial improvement over the
"God of the gaps?" Do not both of these concepts rest their case with a deus ex
machina?
In "The Question of Natural Purpose," Philip R. Sloan explores the question,
Does the concept of evolution necessarily entail or even imply a lack of purpose
or direction to natural history? The essay opens with an historical survey beginning
at the 17th century. According to Sloan there occurred a shift in the concept of
creation from an existence-giving act of God to an activity of teleological ordering.
The dependence of ordering on divine action was then weakened by the development of a concept of "nature" as an active, explanatory cause for the development
of order. Furthermore, the impersonal character of natural ordering threatens a
broad array of concepts in the domain of design, purpose, and teleology.
Against this background Sloan discusses the varied views on purpose expressed
by Darwin. It appears that while Darwin rejected an interventionist concept of
purposeful evolution in specific lineages, he was unwilling to abandon the idea
of purpose and design when considering the universe as a whole.
In an all too brief closing section, Sloan looks at some of the ways that
contemporary biology has affected the question of natural purpose. Here Sloan
argues that even if one grants that the basic mechanisms of evolution can be
accounted for in terms of nonteleological principles, the biblical concept of
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creation as an existence-giving act of Yahweh remains vital. The challenges to
creation doctrine, says Sloan, have arisen because of the shift from a focus on
ontological matters of existence to details of the ordering process. While I am
inclined toward the same point of view, it seems to me that we must still face
the question of governance as an integral component of God's activity as Creator.
More work needs to be done.
Dianne Bergant and Carroll Stuhlmueller collaborated to write a compact essay
on "Creation according to the Old Testament." Though the scope of this study
was limited, the principal theses strike me as extremely important, whetting the
appetite for a more extensive development.
According to Bergant and Stuhlmueller, when the O. T. speaks about creation
the primary focus is on the person of Yahweh the Creator, the created world
receiving only secondary attention. Furthermore, the Hebrew concept of Creator
places emphasis on God's present activity, with its promise for the future, while
subordinating attention to the past.
Concerning the creation narratives found in Genesis 1 and 2, Bergant and
Stuhlmueller conclude that they should not be viewed as cosmological accounts
of formative history; they are concerned neither with creatio ex nihilo nor with
evolutionary processes, but rather they function to reassure God's people of his
ability, as the everpresent and sovereign king, to bring order out of chaos.
Though narrative inform, these passages should never be viewed as some peculiar
kind of eyewitness report; their focus is not cosmological or chronological, but
theological. They function as elements in covenant theology, not as mere compressed chronicle. Amen.
Questions concerning the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo are engaged in a direct
and articulate manner by David Kelsey in his essay on 'The Doctrine of Creation
from Nothing." The discussion is conveniently divided into a consideration of
the scope of the doctrine and an historical overview of what have served as
warrants for the doctrine. Within the scope of creation doctrine, says Kelsey,
are statements concerning God-his world-relatedness-and statements concerning the world-the character of its God-relatedness. Closely allied with these
truth claims are personal commitments to act in a certain way as a creature in
a God-created world.
Of particular interest to me was Kelsey's development of the distinction
between metaphysical and historical claims concerning the world as God's creation. Claims that the universe is intelligible, distinct from God, and radically
contingent upon God's continuing existence-giving activity are metaphysical
components in creation doctrine. But the doctrine of creation has often been
thought of as an historical claim that the world's existence began at a specific
instant in time as the product of a divine act of inception. In our day, for example,
the creation/evolution discussion, as it is popularly perceived, has degenerated
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into a debate concerning whether or when this instantaneous inception event
took place. However, Kelsey argues, the metaphysical claims concerning the
world's dependent relationship on God as Creator are logically detachable from
the historical questions concerning the world's inception, formative development,
and duration. In the context of this distinction, the either/or structure of the
contemporary creation/evolution debate is exposed for its sheer stupidity. Neither
naturalistic evolutionism nor "scientific" creationism deserves any accolades for
its perceptiveness on this matter. As I see it, the sooner the Christian community
becomes aware of this distinction the sooner it can resume an effective witness
to a scientifically well informed world. All segments of the Christian community
could benefit from Kelsey's identification of the metaphysical component of the
doctrine of creation ex nihilo as primary, not at all dependent on a particular
historical model of the creation's inception, duration, or formative history.
The warrants for the doctrine of creation ex nihilo have varied through time
and have drawn from numerous sources. Appeals to Scripture have been colored
by the "spectacles" of creedal formulae through which Scripture is read. Furthermore, the doctrine has been formulated in a variety of polemical contexts; ex
nihilo has, for example, been employed as a defense against concepts of the
eternity of matter and against spirit/matter dualism. Thus the doctrine of creation
ex nihilo cannot be treated as an elaboration of biblical cosmology alone. Once
again, this is something that the contemporary Christian community must come
to know as a first step out of the swamp of the creation/evolution debate as it
is presently structured.
In the essay "God's Action in the World" William P. Alston explores the
question of whether God ever personally acts in ways that extend beyond the
realm of naturally occurring phenomena (perhaps even contravening the "laws
of nature"), thereby producing specific effects in the created world. Alston
assumes God to be continuously active in sustaining the world's existence and
in governing its regular behavior according to a coherent set of patterns. Against
this background of seeing nearly everything as "done by God," or by his created
agents, or at least permitted by God to occur in his created world, Alston is
concerned to look at those "special" acts that are commonly labelled "acts of God."
What is the nature of these "special acts?" A traditional answer might be that
they represent acts of direct divine intervention. Such divine action would be
"special" for its circumvention of "natural causes." While Alston readily grants
the possibility of this sort of direct divine intervention (he finds arguments against
it unconvincing), he goes on to argue that the concept of supernatural intervention
is not required to maintain a belief that God actively interacts with his creatures.
God's work, says Alston, within the patterns of the "natural order" are sufficient
warrant for that belief.
Although such an openness to both possibilities resonates with my own judg-
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ment on this matter, I am uncomfortable with some ofthe (conventional) language
that Alston employes here. The term "intervention," for example, suggests the
existence of a nearly autonomous "nature" which God must forcibly break into
in order to act. Similarly, the familiar natural/supernatural terminology suggests
a distinction between (supernatural) phenomena which do require God's action
and those (natural) phenomena which do not. And to speak of God's "use of
natural causes" may appear to give these natural causes too high a status--one
which overlooks their contingency on divine governance. Alston makes it clear
that he does not view "nature" as an autonomous entity, but employing the
traditional terms "laws of nature" and "supernatural intervention" does evoke
such an image nonetheless. I prefer Alston's references to "direct action" in
place of "supernatural."
But can we speak of "special acts" of God without employing the idea of
direct intervention? Yes, says Alston. Certain acts of God become distinct from
the mainstream of divine action by their power to invoke in us a sense of specific
divine purpose in their occurrence. These divine acts become special by our
perception of their role in the realization of God's will. An interesting proposition,
I would say, but doesn't that place a heavy burden on the accuracy of our
perceptions? And how do we evaluate one another's claims to know God's
specific purposes? Should the "specialness" of God's action be so dependent on
human perception?
While the relevance of a general consideration of God's action in the world
may be evident, I would like to have seen this work applied to the specific topics
of creation and evolution. How, for example, might we see God purposefully
at work in the evolutionary development of species in the created world? If I
understand Alston correctly, I suppose he would say that whether or not the
introduction of new species required direct divine (supernatural) intervention is
relatively unimportant. The more important matter is to discern God's purposes
being realized in the formation of creatures capable of knowing him as their
Creator and gratefully serving him as their Redeemer. Alston's line of thought
raises an amusing question: If our discernment of divine purpose qualifies events
or processes as "special" acts of God, do we have here an entirely new way of
picturing "special creation?"
James F. Ross asks, "Could humans have evolved, yet be capable of life
forever with God?" If so, he notes, "Christians get the best of evolution," which
is the title of his essay. Ross argues that intelligent beings are not merely resultant,
but emergent from micromatter, and he explores "some of the conditions for
emergent being, which could, of course, appear in nature by evolution," a process
he characterizes as "a goal-directed spread out way of coming to be from secondary causes." Written in the jargon of the professional specialist, this is not an
easy essay to read. Exercising a measure of prudence, I shall leave the evaluation
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of Ross's essay to the appropriate specialists.
William H. Austin's essay, "Evolutionary Explanations of Religion and Morality," is a critique of E. O. Wilson's advocacy of scientific materialism as a
superior alternative to "traditional religion" as the provider of a credible
worldview and as a source of moral guidance. According to Wilson, a sociobiological explanation of religion is capable of discrediting it. While some persons
may wish summarily to dismiss this claim, Austin argues that Wilson's program
for replacing theistic religion with evolutionary naturalism needs to be seriously
engaged. Doing so, he says, will demonstrate the weaknesses of Wilson's
attempted explanations, thereby draining the force out of his claims to have
discredited religious belief concerning moral principles. Nevertheless, what if
one were able to construct a reasonably strong argument that certain religiously
based practices survive principally because they are adaptive? Austin explores
that possibility, concluding that such an argument, even though it may threaten
the claim that a certain practice is the response to divine injunction, may still
favor the claim that this practice is good to follow. Finally, Wilson's program,
we recall, is to substitute evolutionary naturalism in place of traditional religion
as a source of moral principles and ethical guidance. How successful is he? Not
too surprisingly, Austin sees very little that Wilson could count as significant
accomplishment toward the goals of this program, and little that would serve as
a basis for optimism that future efforts would fare any better.
"Production and Prospect: Reflections on Christian Hope and Original Sin" is
the title of Nicholas Lash's essay on the relationships between evolutionary views
of human origins and Christian doctrines of sin and redemption. Because the
essential elements of humanity lie beyond the scope of natural science, it is
improper, says Lash, for scientific inquiry to be "anthropically focused." Concurrently, theology, concerned principally with the human/divine relationship, ought
not to offer alternative accounts of mankind's production (formative history),
which is in the domain of natural science, but should focus on the prospects for
its destiny.
Lash stresses the unity of the doctrines of creation and redemption: from our
experience of God as Redeemer we are moved to confess God as Creator. On
the question of "beginnings" Lash notes that Genesis 2 and 3 are not about the
way things once were, but how they ought to be and, by God's redeeming grace,
will someday be. "Original sin" is the way things are: responsible human creatures
stand in need of divine redemption.
From what he says in this essay, I am tempted to infer that Lash judges
evolutionary theory, because of its inability to speak to the ultimate meaning of
the human presence in cosmic ontology or cosmic history, to be irrelevant to
the Christian doctrine of creation. I doubt, however, that Lash would place these
two concepts in isolation from one another. I wish that Lash had been more
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explicit on this point. While the scientific concept of evolution and the theological
doctrine of creation do speak to different questions ("production" and "prospect"
in Lash's terminology), we still seek the unifying relationship of these concepts.
Having begun with an historical review, this well-integrated series of essays
concludes with a consideration of Teilhard de Chardin's vision for the future.
Christopher F. Mooney provides us with a congenial and concise summary of
Teilhard's lifelong project of uniting the two creation stories: the sacred creation
story found in Scripture (a thoroughly Christ-centered story), and the scientific
"creation" story of evolutionary development. Mooney closes with an admonition
that we should perhaps ask not about the "truth" of Teilhard's propositions, but
rather about the coherence and fruitfulness of his prophetic vision for Christian
life, Christian thought, and Christian hope for the future-all of these oriented
by the experience of God's creative love in Christ.

